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This article analyses one among possible means of facilitating the supply of financial services from
the UK into the Member States of the EU and the European Economic Area ( EEA), post-Brexit. It
sets out the legal framework and the relevant EU authorities that determine third-country equivalence.
Introduction
The importance and value of banking and the financial services and investment industry to the British
economy as measured by any metric (GDP, tax receipts, trade balance, inward investment, direct and
indirect employment etc) needs no restatement. The credit crunch and the global financial crisis
commencing in 2007–08 threatened the primacy and formerly more affirmative attitudes held towards
financial services in British society1; the economic crisis also produced changes in the regulatory
approach taken by relevant authorities: principally the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA), the
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)2 and the Bank of England (BoE). A qualitatively distinctive and a
historically unprecedented challenge arose with the referendum in June 2016 and the consequent
planned departure of the UK from the EU.3
The proliferation of speech and writing about Brexit focuses on the larger question of the negotiation
underway between UK and EU representatives and the politically fraught question of Britain’s
relationship with the single market and the "divorce" and terms for the relationship after March 2019.
Within the literature specific to financial services, some analyses have considered a particular
arrangement under which the UK leaves the single market but preserves a preferential (in some
sense) ability to offer financial services in the EU/EEA.4 One *I.C.C.L.R. 2 such arrangement is the
subject of this article: third-country equivalence.5 That is: an EU determination that the UK (as a third
country—vis-à-vis the EU) is one whose regulations in relation to some specified subset of financial
services are equivalent to those of EU law, and which would therefore not incur compliance burdens
(beyond those imposed by the relevant UK authorities) in order to operate and offer financial and
investment services in the EU/EEA.
The current position—comprehensive EU/EEA passporting
The legal position in general at present, pre-Brexit, is that companies and financial institutions
authorised by the relevant authorities of their home state (where the home state is an EU/EEA
country), including those of the UK, may supply financial services in any other EU/EEA state without
the necessity of seeking authorisation from the financial service regulators in the host state. The legal
basis for this position is composed of a variety of EU directives6 under which financial institutions may
apply for a "passport" with which the services they offer can effectively travel to the other EU/EEA
states.7 The European passport, or (synonymously) the single licence, embodies the European
Commission’s (EC’s) approach to harmonisation of regulations in relation to financial services8 and is
a key component of the programme of harmonisation agreed and undertaken by the EU/EEA states.9
The home country retains regulatory control, which is at most *I.C.C.L.R. 3 supplemented by minimal
or light-touch regulation of the host state.10 Effectively, a financial company offers its services in
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another state, just as a trading company could offer goods under the single market without
encountering tariff or non-tariff barriers. Although this position is common to all EU/EEA states, and
therefore applicable to all EU/EEA states other than the UK seeking to supply financial services in the
UK (inbound financial services), the principal concern of this article is outbound financial services:
those emanating from the UK into another EU/EEA state or states.
Eliding a topic area of some speculation and argument, this article operates on the assumption that
more likely than not the UK will leave the single market; this appears the most probable outcome at
time of writing.11 Whether or not there is an interim or transitional period, and irrespective of the
duration of any such interval, this article assumes that, following the departure of the UK from the EU,
EU/EEA states will retain the current right to passport financial services while the UK will lose this
right.12 Therefore, the question that this article seeks to answer is: under what terms may outward
financial services be supplied by UK-based financial institutions into the EU/EEA states post-Brexit?
In answering that question the article offers an examination of one possible solution: third-country
equivalence.13
The implications of Brexit for UK-based financial services
Figures estimating impact of Brexit by scenario are available, although they must be treated with
caution. For example, a "‘low access’ post-Brexit scenario has been estimated to result in a loss of
£18–20 billion in revenues".14 The value and reliability of such broad and necessarily highly
speculative measures is certainly open to question and at any rate finer-grained measures are
required regarding financial services. Although not indicative of assets, examining the number of
passports offers a picture of their current importance both inbound into the UK and outbound from the
UK into other EU/EEA states. There are a total of 359,953 (inbound number 23,532 and outbound
336,421)15; these figures suggest that the *I.C.C.L.R. 4 passport has been more important for
companies whose home state is the UK, seeking to trade in the other EEA states, and that therefore
the loss of passporting will affect UK financial services more severely than their EU/EEA competitors
and counterparts post-Brexit.
However, complicating this analysis slightly, a larger number of firms (8,008) have applied for inbound
passports than those UK-based firms seeking outbound passports (5,476).16 Even without an
examination of asset values, this pair of figures combined with that in the previous paragraph
produces the conclusion that UK-based firms are applying for more passports in absolute terms and
per firm than those other EU (and EEA) states seeking to export financial services to the UK.
Although the provision of financial services is not a zero sum game and the UK has developed its own
specialisms and comparative advantage—for example, in OTC derivatives, (re)insurance, currency
and certain commodity markets—these figures nevertheless highlight the importance for the British
economy of a viable alternative arrangement that will at least go some distance to replace the rights
to passport that have been enjoyed by UK-based financial institutions.
The operative assumption of this article is that those UK firms that do not open a branch in an(other)
EU/EEA Member State and operate under that state’s regulatory oversight (with the heightened
compliance costs entailed thereby) will lose the right to offer financial services in that or other EU/EEA
state(s) because they will lose the right to passport. However, it is not possible to quantify the
measure of financial and business loss in this sector without knowing what alternative arrangements
may be put in place. The remainder of the article will consider one legal basis (in the next section)
under which the status quo ante (i.e. the present and pre-Brexit position) could, in theory, be
maintained subject to the qualifications, caveats and practical difficulties attendant upon it. The
purpose of this article is to introduce some analytical clarity about third-country equivalence and not to
make policy proposals or normative arguments about this or any other alternative terms of UK–EU
engagement post-Brexit.
Third-country equivalence—legal tests and procedure
The legal test
As a doctrine of financial services law, third-country equivalence has existed for about three decades
and was designed to "facilitate cross border trading between markets that choose to recognise one
another’s standards"; among the earliest arrangements was one agreed in the1990s "between the UK
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and US covering mutual access to derivatives markets".17 This article’s concern narrows to
third-country equivalence as that concept has been elaborated, codified and institutionalised in the
EU/EEA. *I.C.C.L.R. 5
The legal basis for third-country equivalence is set out in the Markets in Financial Instruments
Regulation (MiFIR) arts 46 – 48.18 Post-Brexit, the issue of equivalency would not arise where a
UK-based financial institution opens a branch in the EU 27 or in an EEA Member State.19 In addition,
it would not arise if the institution were offering investment services exclusively to "eligible
counterparties to professional clients".20 In order for a firm to operate under third-country equivalency,
the firm must be authorised in the jurisdiction where its head office is located (art.46(2)(b)) where it
must be "subject to effective supervision and enforcement ensuring a full compliance with the
requirements applicable in that third country". Article 46(2)(c) requires co-operation arrangements
between the authorising state and the EU to have been established.21
If these tests of the firm and the home state of the firm are satisfied, then under art.46(3) "member
states cannot impose any additional requirements on the third country in relation to matters covered".
The functional result then is the same from the standpoint of the firm as if it were operating under a
passport and the (notionally) ancien regime. However, in the countervailing direction under the MiFIR,
EU Member States cannot treat the equivalent firm "more favourably than union firms".22 This is a
significant provision and resonates with the broader strategic logic that it would not be in the EU
interest if third parties could be treated more favourably than members; to do so would create an
incentive for defection and it would also undermine the reasons for the harmonisation and integration
essential to the single market. This provision also highlights that third-country equivalence is
(notwithstanding the functional similarity) a subordinate, lesser and alternative form of integration and
co-operation as compared with EU/EEA membership and passporting.23
The power to decide whether a country will receive, in a particular area of financial services, the
status of equivalence rests with the EC, under art.47.24 Third-country equivalence is there defined to
mean
"that the legal and supervisory arrangements of that third country ensure that firms authorised in that
third country comply with legally binding prudential and business conduct requirements which have
equivalent effect to the requirements". *I.C.C.L.R. 6 25
The equivalency then is measured in terms of its effect, as opposed to—for example—the substance,
procedural or technical approach inherent in the regulations themselves.26
Article 47(1) sets out the key test for equivalency, which is applied to the "the prudential and business
conduct framework" of non-EU/EEA states. This framework must meet each of the following
conditions: (1) be "subject to authorisation and to effective supervision and enforcement on an
on-going basis"; (2) "sufficient capital requirements and appropriate requirements applicable to
shareholders and members of their management body"; (3) "adequate organisational requirements in
the area of internal control functions"; (4) subject to "appropriate conduct of business rules"; and (5)
"ensures market transparency and integrity by preventing market abuse in the form of insider dealing
and market manipulation". Co-operative arrangements between the EU (the European Securities and
Markets Authority—ESMA) and the third country’s authorities are provided for, as are "information
exchange, notification and procedures for coordination".27
It should be carefully observed that although the object of scrutiny in ascertaining equivalence is the
third country and its regulations, the direct beneficiary of equivalence is individual financial institutions
and firms, with any benefit redounding to their home country being indirect (for example, through tax
receipts and employment). However, there is an asymmetry in that the actions or omissions of a firm
could result in the country losing third-country equivalency. In terms of evidentiary requirements, there
is no legal bar to a decision that a country’s regulatory apparatus is not equivalent that is based
purely on the conduct of a single firm, as such conduct could be construed as prima facie evidence of
its home country’s regulatory inadequacy. The fragility of third-country equivalency and the position of
any country applying for it is thereby evident; it will be further considered below.
Provided a third country achieves equivalence as decided by the EU (subject to the procedures set
out in the next section), this fact is recorded on a register. The register reflects 39 distinct equivalence
areas, grouped under 14 different pieces of EU financial services legislation.28 While these figures
suggest that the areas in which there is an existing legal basis for a finding of equivalence are
extensive,29 they do not exhaust the areas of investment and financial services and activities in which
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UK-based firms currently (or may in the future) seek to operate. *I.C.C.L.R. 7
The institutional application of the legal test
The decision whether or not to grant a country equivalent status is made by a vote of the EU Member
States, in the European Parliament. However, the EC has considerable powers of proposal and
initiative in making recommendations to the Parliament when it puts its recommendation to a vote of
the Member States. The EC has limited scope to act without Member State approval; for
"financial services legislation, the European Commission has a limited ability to adopt a decision that
is not approved of by member states, unless delaying adoption of a decision would create a risk to the
financial interests of the EU as a result of fraud or other illegal activities".30
The EC31 takes the technical advice of its Directorate General for Financial Services; this advice is
based upon recommendations, data and analysis supplied by the three cross-EU supervisory
authorities: the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Securities and Markets Authority
(ESMA) and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA).32 According to
the EC’s explanation of the process, the ESMA scrutinises the third country and, together with the
EC, the two bodies assess
"whether the rules of the authority in the third country achieve the same objectives as the EU, i.e. a
robust CCP [Central Counterparties] framework promoting financial stability through a reduction in
systemic risk".33
If the decision is positive, it is implemented in a "legally binding implementing act in accordance with
Article 25(6) of the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) (Regulation (EU) No 648/2012)
". *I.C.C.L.R. 8 34
Analysing third-country equivalence
Examples of third countries granted equivalency status
Thirty-five countries have received an equivalency status in at least one area of financial services.35 In
the EU’s publication of the roster of these countries, two additional countries (Israel and Chile) are
listed, presumably as they have applied for equivalency status. Several countries have attained only
one equivalency: Mauritius, Egypt, Russia, the Caymans and Abu Dhabi (not a country but an emirate
in the federal United Arab Emirates—UAE). Another UAE emirate, Dubai (which is footnoted as Dubai
International Financial Centre—DIFC), has three. The highest in number are the US and Canada,
which have 16 each.
The limits of equivalency
While an EC finding of equivalency is not a limitation but an opportunity for non-EU/EEA countries
such as those referenced immediately above, from the standpoint of a present but soon to be former
member of the EU (i.e. the UK), third-country equivalence appears to be a limited option owing to the
base-line comparison of passporting under the single market and as an EU Member State. This
section examines these limitations as compared with the present position and the right to passporting
integral to it.
The discretion of the EC in finding (and formulating the terms of) third-country equivalence in relation
to the post-Brexit UK is wide. A finding of third-country equivalence can be conditional or limited in
time; it may be revoked or suspended essentially at will, without any avenue of appeal. The fact that,
at the moment the UK ceases to be an EU Member State, each entity will share identical regulatory
frameworks suggests that a finding of equivalence would be apposite and arguable at that time.
However, such an observation does not bind the EC even if it may rationally be in the best interests of
both the UK and the EU—at least when financial services are considered in isolation. Post-Brexit
changes to the EU regulation of financial services, however, could gradually alter this opening
position, and the UK would not be a party to the processes and discussions leading to the underlying
legislative and regulatory changes.
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If the EU decided to "‘gold plate’ … standards in ways that the UK does not wish to follow",36 the UK
would no longer have a defensible claim to being deemed equivalent, necessitating either doing
without equivalence or acquiescing to the form of gold plating or other regulatory change adopted by
the EU. The corollary of this scenario, one in which the UK sought to achieve "super equivalence", is
also conceivable but even then a finding of equivalence would be a privilege and not a right.37 In
short, there is no certainty or assurance that the relevant UK *I.C.C.L.R. 9 authorities will continue to
maintain a standard that is and is found by the EC and its advisory authorities to satisfy the legal tests
for third-country equivalence.
Even if the UK were to secure equivalency in each of the areas in which it has been awarded (which
no country has done to date),38 in order to maintain the status quo ante Brexit, it would be necessary
for the EC to add new areas of equivalence, not among the 39 already extant.39 There is no legal
reason why novel areas could not be created de novo, although this would surely not happen quickly
owing in no small measure to political considerations. A further practical issue is that there is no legal
obligation regarding the time within which a decision must be made regarding an equivalence
application.40
In a further distinction between passporting and equivalence, art.49 of the MiFIR gives the ESMA the
power to withdraw registration of an equivalency finding, implying that on a continuing and indefinite
basis equivalency is conditional and discretionary. Importantly, such deregistration expressly could
occur on the basis of the conduct of a firm, not of the regulatory authorities of a country where: "the
third country firm is acting in a manner which is clearly prejudicial to the interests of investors or the
orderly functioning of markets"; the "firm has seriously infringed the provisions applicable to it in the
third country and on the basis of which the Commission has adopted the Decision"41; or the ESMA
has
"referred the matter to the competent authority of the third country and that third-country competent
authority has not taken the appropriate measures needed to protect investors and the proper
functioning of the markets in the Union or has failed to demonstrate that the third-country firm
concerned complies with the requirements applicable to it in the third country".42
The only duty incumbent upon the ESMA is to give at least 30 days’ notice before withdrawing the
equivalence.43 However highly firms or countries rate the probability of a change in status, the art.49
MiFIR provisions introduce uncertainty and an additional challenge and complexity to business
development and corporate strategic planning, with what would very likely be manifestly insufficient
notice to change course or re-direct assets and resources. At the same time, however, the provision
and availing of financial services in those significant areas in which the *I.C.C.L.R. 10 UK has found
or developed comparative advantage weighs with some force not only on the UK as offeror but also
upon EU market participants as offeree.44
Conclusion—considerations attendant on the larger Brexit process
As one element of a multi-faceted and an unprecedented historical process, the issue of equivalence
or alternative terms upon which financial services may be offered by UK-based institutions and
companies into the EU/EEA post-Brexit cannot be viewed in isolation. While, as asserted at the outset
of this article, banking and financial services are of substantial national importance in Britain, neither
this nor any single factor is of infinite weight in the calculations of the British Government and its
agents tasked with the ongoing negotiations. One suggestion is that beginning to establish
third-country equivalence, or more realistically setting the groundwork for doing so, should be part of
the Brexit negotiations,45 with a precedent of such a "pre-emptive" equivalence being the Solvency II
Directive 46 for insurance.47 However, equivalence as provided for under arts 46 – 48 of the MiFID
cannot be achieved until the UK actually becomes a third country: that is, until it has formally ceased
to be an EU Member State48 under art.50 TFEU.
Another suggestion is that an enhanced version of equivalence (or "equivalence plus"), in which UK
sectors not currently considered for equivalence by the EC could be deemed equivalent under newly
created categories,49 addressing the issue noted above that equivalence has never ranged across the
entire spectrum of financial services and cannot therefore be a fully adequate substitute for
passporting. As also observed above, as preparatory action to equivalence, or for that matter for
equivalence-plus, co-operation agreements would be a necessary precondition; this might be the
UK’s thin edge of the wedge in relation to the Brexit negotiation.
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Some observers argue that equivalence, at least across existing dimensions, is rendered somewhat
realistic and in any case nominally more feasible owing to new EU securities regulations (MiFID II)50
which come into force in January 2018.51 Of course, what may make at least an emergent
third-country equivalence more probable for the UK would be concessions in other areas of
negotiations, whether *I.C.C.L.R. 11 in relation to trade or movement of persons, or some other facet
or combination of issues arising in the negotiation, including the possibility of UK contributions to the
EU budget post-Brexit. British domestic politics may be a limiting or an enabling factor. As noted in
the introduction, the sympathies of the population at large for bankers and the financial services
sector are by no means running high at this point in time so there may be continued resistance to
sacrifices in other areas—as well as against greater UK payments: an upfront and very visible cost,
for a deferred benefit, and a benefit that the majority of the British electorate is unlikely to rate very
highly, whether rightly or wrongly.
This article compared the status quo ante Brexit, under which financial institutions whose home state
is the UK may offer investment and financial services in the EU/EEA (without having opened a branch
in another EU member or in an EEA state) and the use of and powers afforded to these financial
institutions by a passport, with third-country equivalency. It set out the legal tests for third-country
equivalence and the institutional decision procedures under which a status of equivalence is awarded
(or denied) and an illustrative sampling of the countries to which the status of equivalence have been
granted by the EU.
The areas of financial and investment services that have been deemed equivalent by the pertinent EU
authorities were set out and illustrated. This has led inexorably to the conclusion that, while these are
wide-ranging, there are significant areas in which UK financial institutions currently rely upon
passporting but which have not been areas where equivalences have been found by the EU with any
third country. Some (arguably somewhat sanguine) Brexit scenarios suggest that these and other
novel areas and directives could be negotiated as areas of potential and/or pre-emptive equivalency,
subject to the necessary preliminary co-operation agreements being concluded between the UK and
the EU authorities in the lead-up to and following the date upon which the UK ceases to be an EU
Member State.
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